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ERIE DENIED: HOW FEDERAL COURTS DECIDE 
INSURANCE COVERAGE CASES DIFFERENTLY AND  
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 
 
JOHN L. WATKINS1 
 
*** 
Application of the Erie doctrine requires that federal courts 
exercising diversity jurisdiction apply substantive state law consistent with 
the state’s highest court as a matter of federalism and to discourage forum 
shopping.  This Article analyzes the reality, however, that federal courts 
decide important unsettled questions of state law differently than state 
courts, which undermines these two fundamental underpinnings of the Erie 
doctrine.  Further, this Article demonstrates, through various examples, 
how these incorrect “Erie guesses” can have profound practical 
implications in the insurance context due to the standard use of form 
contracts for drafting insurance policies.  As a result, litigants battle 
fiercely over the judicial forum, as federal courts are perceived, 
particularly by insurers, to decide procedural and substantive issues of 
state law differently than state courts.   
Considering that the abolishment of diversity jurisdiction is highly 
improbable, this Article argues that federal courts should adopt clear, 
uniform standards that favor the liberal use of certification of unsettled 
questions of state law to the state’s highest court.  A constitutionally 
consistent approach to certification would promote the principles of 
federalism that underlie the Erie doctrine, and would render moot the less 
productive question of why federal courts decide the issues differently.    
*** 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction decide cases 
differently than state courts despite their obligation under the Erie doctrine2 
to apply substantive law in the same manner as the state courts.  Federal 
courts periodically make incorrect “Erie guesses” of unsettled questions of 
state law as later determined by the state’s highest court.3 In many 
instances, however, the state’s highest court will not have the opportunity 
to correct the error because the issue never reaches it. 
Insurance coverage litigation provides a particularly important 
subject for studying this phenomenon for several reasons.  First, federal 
courts are routinely called on to decide coverage questions, so there is a 
large body of case law to examine.  Second, supreme courts from different 
states often reach diametrically different conclusions in deciding important 
coverage issues based on identical insurance policy language.4 The 
                                                                                                                 
2 See generally Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (mandating 
that a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction must apply state substantive 
law). 
3 The term “Erie guess” (referring to a federal court’s deciding of unsettled 
questions of state law) appears to have originated with the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which stated in Grey v. Hayes-Sammons Chemical 
Co., 310 F.2d 291, 295 (5th Cir. 1962), that Erie required it to “make an Erie, 
educated guess” as to Mississippi law. “Erie guess” is now used widely in the 
literature. 
4 For example, state courts are about equally divided on whether a 
construction defect resulting from negligent construction constitutes an 
“occurrence” under a commercial general liability insurance policy. Compare Am. 
Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Hathaway Dev. Co., 707 S.E.2d 369, 372 (Ga. 
2011) (defective construction may constitute an “occurrence”), with Essex Ins. Co. 
v. Holder, 261 S.W.3d 456, 460 (Ark. 2008) (defective construction not an 
“occurrence”). State courts are also divided about equally on whether the “sudden 
and accidental” pollution exclusion applies to bar coverage for the unintended 
release of pollutants over a long period of time. Compare Claussen v. Aetna Cas. 
& Sur. Co., 380 S.E.2d 686, 688–89 (Ga. 1989) (finding “sudden” does not 
necessarily mean “abrupt” and is reasonably interpreted to mean “unexpected” and 
hence holding coverage not excluded for discharge over extended period of time), 
with Dutton-Lainson Co. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 716 N.W.2d 87, 97–100 (Neb. 2006) 
(deciding an event occurring over a period of time is not “sudden” and rejecting 
Claussen). The cases on this contentious issue are collected in Dutton-Lainson. 
Similarly, the courts are sharply split on whether the “absolute pollution exclusion” 
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potential for such divergence increases the possibility of an erroneous 
guess when a federal court decides an unsettled coverage question because 
of the likelihood of conflicting persuasive precedents from other 
jurisdictions.  Third, the consequences of an incorrect Erie guess in 
coverage cases can have profound practical implications beyond the 
immediate case because insurance policies are typically written on common 
forms.  A mistaken determination in one case may thus be repeated many 
times over in being applied as persuasive precedent to other claims.  This is 
an important consideration. 
This Article will demonstrate that federal courts have often guessed 
incorrectly in deciding important coverage issues.  Moreover, the anecdotal 
view that insurers favor federal courts over state courts for both procedural 
and substantive reasons is supported by available survey and statistical 
evidence.  The result is that federal courts often dispense—and are 
perceived to dispense—a different brand of justice than state courts. 
The Article next examines how the practice of deciding unsettled 
coverage issues undermines the Erie doctrine.  Erie has two fundamental 
underpinnings: First, the case firmly established that a state’s highest court 
has the right to determine state law.5 Second, Erie was meant to discourage 
                                                                                                                 
precludes claims not involving environmental pollutants. Compare Reed v. Auto-
Owners Ins. Co., 667 S.E.2d 90, 92 (Ga. 2008) (showing a claim arising from 
accidental release of carbon monoxide at rental house precluded by absolute 
pollution exclusion even though it did not involve environmental pollution), with 
Am. States Ins. Co. v. Koloms, 687 N.E.2d 72, 82 (Ill. 1997) (holding a claim 
arising from accidental release of carbon monoxide not precluded by absolute 
pollution exclusion, which must be read in the context of its purpose of limiting 
coverage for environmental contamination). 
5 See Erie, 304 U.S. at 822 (“Except in matters governed by the Federal 
Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of 
the state. And whether the law of the state shall be declared by its Legislature in a 
statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern.”). 
Erie was decided on constitutional grounds, and this aspect of the decision, and 
others, have provoked a plethora of articles and debate. See, e.g., 17A JAMES WM. 
MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 124App.03 (Daniel R. Coquillette 
et al. eds., 3d ed. 2007) (citing numerous articles). With that said, Erie’s reliance 
on constitutional grounds is explicit and as prominent scholars have noted: “In the 
end . . . Erie must be accepted as a constitutional decision.” 19 CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 4505 (2d ed. Supp. 2013). The main volume of Wright, Miller, and 
Cooper notes Erie’s explicit reliance on the Constitution and contains an extensive 
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forum shopping between the federal and state courts.6  When federal courts 
decide unsettled questions of state law, they intrude on the first principle.  
And when they decide—or even when they are perceived to decide—those 
questions differently than the state courts, they undermine the second. 
Finally, the Article examines possible solutions.  Almost all states 
now have statutes allowing federal appellate courts (and sometimes district 
courts) to certify unsettled questions of state law to a state’s highest court 
for decision.  Although the United States Supreme Court has 
enthusiastically endorsed certification on a number of occasions, the use of 
the certification procedure by the lower federal courts is haphazard.  The 
Supreme Court has never established standards for certification, and, left to 
their own devices, the federal appellate courts have espoused a crazy quilt 
of certification standards, ranging from liberally granting certification to 
using it sparingly.  The solution is straight-forward: The federal courts 
should adopt uniform standards favoring the liberal use of certification of 
unsettled questions of state law to a state’s highest court. 
 
II. FEDERAL COURTS MAKE INCORRECT ERIE GUESSES 
 
Federal courts have made many incorrect Erie guesses, particularly 
in insurance coverage cases.  This is not meant to be a blanket criticism of 
                                                                                                                 
collection of authorities. See generally Ernest A. Young, A General Defense of 
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 10 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 17 (2013) (containing a 
lengthy examination of Erie, its defenders and detractors). This Article will not 
wade into these controversies. The fundamental principle of Erie, that a state’s 
highest court has the final say on issues of state law, is so well-established that it 
cannot be seriously questioned. See Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 
226 (1991) (“Erie mandates that a federal court sitting in diversity apply the 
substantive law of the forum State, absent a federal statutory or constitutional 
directive to the contrary.”).   
6 See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 638 (1964) (quoting Guar. Trust 
Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (“The nub of the policy that 
underlies [Erie] is that for the same transaction the accident of a suit by a non-
resident litigant in a federal court instead of in a state court a block away, should 
not lead to a substantially different result.”); see also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 
460, 468 (1965) (“[T]he twin aims of the Erie rule: [are the] discouragement of 
forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.”); Salve 
Regina, 499 U.S. at 234 (citing Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468) (explaining that the twin 
aims of Erie are avoiding the inequitable administration of justice and forum 
shopping). 
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the federal judiciary, nor is it meant to suggest that federal courts routinely 
make incorrect determinations of state law.  Nevertheless, as some federal 
judges have candidly acknowledged, mistakes have been made.  In the 
insurance context, the incorrect guess is particularly likely to be amplified 
due to the use of form contracts, making it more likely for the mistake to be 
repeated as precedent. 
 
A.  GENERALLY 
 
A number of distinguished jurists have recognized that incorrect 
Erie guesses have plagued the federal judiciary for years in many different 
substantive areas of the law.  In 1964, Judge Brown of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit observed that his court’s record in 
predicting state law was terrible, particularly regarding Florida law: 
 
Within the very recent past, both Texas and Alabama have 
overruled decisions of this Court, and the score in Florida 
cases is little short of staggering.  In similar, but 
subsequent, cases, the Florida Courts have expressly 
repudiated our holdings in a number of cases.  And now 
that we have this remarkable facility of certification, we 
have not yet “guessed right” on a single case.7  
 
Writing twenty-eight years later, Judge Sloviter of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit observed that the predictions had not 
improved: 
 
[T]he state courts have found fault with a not insignificant 
number of past “Erie guesses” made by the Third Circuit 
and our district courts.  Despite our best efforts to predict 
the future thinking of the state supreme courts within our 
jurisdiction on the basis of all of the available data, we 
have guessed wrong on questions of the breadth of 
arbitration clauses in automobile insurance policies (we 
                                                                                                                 
7 United Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483, 486 (5th Cir. 1964) 
(Brown, J., concurring) (citations omitted); see also Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 
U.S. 386, 390 n.6 (1974) (noting former Fifth Circuit’s tendency to grant 
certification to state courts because of errors in predicting state law). 
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predicted they would not extend to disputes over the 
entitlement to coverage, but they do), the availability of 
loss of consortium damages for unmarried cohabitants (we 
predicted they would be available, but they are not), the 
“unreasonably dangerous” standard in products liability 
cases (we predicted the Restatement would not apply, but it 
does), and the applicability of the “discovery rule” to 
wrongful death and survival actions (we predicted it would 
toll the statute of limitations, but it does not).  And this list 
is by no means exhaustive. 
 
It is not that Third Circuit judges are particularly poor 
prognosticators.  All of the circuits have similar problems 
in predicting state law accurately.8 
 
As shown herein, there is no indication that the federal courts have gotten 
better in making predictions since Judge Sloviter’s article. 
 
B. INSURANCE COVERAGE CASES 
The federal courts have made incorrect Erie guesses in many 
insurance coverage cases.  Even worse, these mistakes have often been on 
important recurring issues regarding the interpretation of common 
insurance policy provisions. 
 
1. Environmental Response Costs as “Damages” 
 
One of the more contentious insurance coverage issues of the 
1980s and 1990s was whether environmental response costs such as 
cleanup costs and monitoring costs imposed under the federal 
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation Liability Act 
(CERCLA) were covered as “damages” under commercial general liability 
policies (“CGL”).  In Continental Insurance Co. v. Northeastern 
Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co. (“NEPACCO”), the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit made an Erie guess under Missouri law 
                                                                                                                 
8 Dolores K. Sloviter, A Federal Judge Views Diversity Jurisdiction Through 
the Lens of Federalism, 78 VA. L. REV. 1671, 1679–80 (1992) (footnotes omitted). 
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and held that response costs were not “damages.”9 The NEPACCO court 
reasoned that “damages” should be defined “in the insurance context” 
rather than “outside the insurance context,” and that in the “insurance 
context” they were not considered “damages.”10 Nine years later, in 
Farmland Industries, Inc. v. Republic Insurance Co., the Supreme Court of 
Missouri held that response costs were “damages” under commercial 
general liability and other policies issued by the insurers and thus 
covered.11 The Farmland court squarely rejected the Eighth Circuit’s guess: 
 
The NEPACCO court misconstrues and circumvents 
Missouri law.  The cases upon which the NEPACCO court 
relies for the proposition that “damages” distinguishes 
between claims at law and claims at equity are not 
persuasive.  The cases do not determine the ordinary 
meaning of “damages” as required by Missouri law.  
Furthermore, no authority allows this Court to define 
words “in the insurance context.”  To give words in an 
insurance contract a technical meaning simply by reading 
them “in the insurance context,” would render meaningless 
our law's requirement that words be given their ordinary 
meaning unless a technical meaning is plainly intended.12 
 
Similarly, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that environmental response 
costs were recoverable “as damages” under a CGL policy in Bausch & 
Lomb Inc. v. Utica Mutual Insurance Co.13 In Bausch & Lomb, the court 
specifically disavowed an earlier “Erie guess” to the contrary by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Maryland Casualty Co. v. 
Armco, Inc.14 The Bausch & Lomb court stated: 
 
                                                                                                                 
9 See Cont’l Ins. Cos. v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977, 987 (8th Cir. 
1991) (en banc). 
10 Id. at 985. 
11 Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Republic Ins. Co., 941 S.W.2d 505, 512 (Mo. 
1997). 
12 Id. at 510. 
13 Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 625 A.2d 1021, 1037 (Md. 
1993). 
14 See generally Md. Cas. Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir.1987). 
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To the extent it suggests that the term “damages” imports a 
distinctively legal meaning in insurance matters, Armco 
misperceives the law of Maryland.  As discussed earlier, 
we accord to words their usual and accepted signification. 
“Damages” in common usage means the reparation in 
money for a detriment or injury sustained.  The reasonably 
prudent layperson does not cut nice distinctions between 
the remedies offered at law and in equity.  Absent an 
express provision in the document itself, insurance policy-
holders surely do not anticipate that coverage will depend 
on the mode of relief, i.e. a cash payment rather than an 
injunction, sought by an injured party.  Policy-holders will, 
instead, reasonably infer that the insurer’s pledge to pay 
damages will apply generally to compensatory outlays of 
various kinds, including expenditures made to comply with 
administrative orders or formal injunctions.15 
 
In its analysis, the court criticized the Fourth Circuit for overlooking case 
law establishing that insurance policies must be interpreted in accordance 
with the expectations of a reasonably prudent layperson.16  
The Bausch & Lomb opinion noted the approach of many federal 
courts differed from the views of state courts on the recovery of 
environmental response costs as “damages” under CGL policies: 
 
In confronting the legal issues present in the instant case, 
the majority of state appellate courts have concluded that 
the standard insuring language covers environmental 
response costs.  They have construed the term “damages” 
to reach both monetary compensation to government 
agencies or aggrieved third parties and the expense of 
complying with environmental injunctions.  The federal 
courts divide more or less evenly on the question.17 
 
                                                                                                                 
15 Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 625 A.2d at 1032–33. 
16 Id. at 1032 n.6. But despite this aspect of the court’s decision, it ultimately 
found in favor of the insurer, and found that the absence of third party property 
damage meant there was no coverage under the facts of the case. Id. at 1036. 
17 Id. at 1030 (citations omitted). 
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This observation suggests there have been additional incorrect Erie guesses 
on this recurring issue. 
 
2. Negligent Construction as an “Occurrence” 
 
One of the most hotly contested issues in insurance coverage 
litigation in the past several years is whether negligently performed 
construction can constitute an “occurrence” under a CGL policy.  Federal 
courts have made incorrect Erie guesses on this important issue.  In 
Georgia, the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Georgia and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
issued a series of decisions holding that negligently performed construction 
could not constitute an occurrence.  The first decision was Owners 
Insurance Co. v. James, which held that negligent installation of synthetic 
stucco could not be an occurrence because “the insurance policies at issue 
in this case provide coverage for injury resulting from accidental acts, but 
not for an injury accidentally caused by intentional acts.”18 This 
distinction—difficult even to comprehend—was embraced in other federal 
decisions.19 One federal judge expressed dismay regarding this approach, 
although he followed it, noting that the precedent “may create an awkward 
environment” for parties seeking to insure risks because “almost every 
conceivable accident involves some intentional action at some point in the 
chain of causation.”20  
When the issue reached the Supreme Court of Georgia, the court 
not only held that negligent construction could be an occurrence, but it also 
expressly rejected the reasoning of the federal cases: “[W]e reject out of 
                                                                                                                 
18 See Owners Ins. Co. v. James, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1364 (N.D. Ga. 2003). 
19 Owners Ins. Co. v. Chadd’s Lake Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., No. 1:03-cv-
2050-WSD (N.D. Ga. Dec. 28, 2004) (“Chadd’s Lake I”); Owners Ins. Co. v. 
Chadd’s Lake Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., No. 1:005-cv-00475-JOF, 2006 WL 
1553888, at *4 (N.D. Ga. May 30, 2006) (“Chadd’s Lake II”); Travelers Indem. 
Co. of Conn. v. Douglasville Dev., LLC, No. 1:07-cv-0410-JOW, 2008 WL 
4372004, at *8–9 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 19, 2008); Hathaway Dev. Co., Inc. v. Ill. Union 
Ins. Co., No. 07-00118-CV-MHS-1, 2008 WL 1773307, at *8–9 (11th Cir. Apr. 
18, 2008).    
20 Douglasville Dev., LLC, 2008 WL 4372004, at *9 (Forrester, J.). It is 
somewhat ironic that the court stated that “every conceivable accident involves 
some intentional action” given that the basic express definition of “occurrence” in 
a CGL policy is an “accident.” 
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hand the assertion that the acts . . . could not be deemed an occurrence or 
accident under the CGL policy because they were performed intentionally.  
‘[A] deliberate act, performed negligently, is an accident if the effect is not 
the intended or expected result . . . .’”21 
Similarly, in Architex Association, Inc. v. Scottsdale Insurance Co. 
the Supreme Court of Mississippi also held that negligent construction 
performed by a subcontractor can constitute an “occurrence” under a CGL 
policy.22 The court held that a contrary Erie guess by the Fifth Circuit in 
ACS Construction Co., Inc. v. CGU23 was “inconsistent with Mississippi 
law.”24 
 
3. Application of the “Sudden and Accidental” Exception 
to the Pollution Exclusion in CGL policies 
 
One of the most frequently and persistently litigated insurance 
coverage issues from the 1980s to today is the interpretation of the 
pollution exclusion in CGL policies with an exception for releases that are 
“sudden and accidental.”  This version of the pollution exclusion, which 
was first utilized in 1973, excludes coverage for bodily injury or property 
damage “arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke, 
                                                                                                                 
21 See Am. Empire Surplus Lines v. Hathaway Dev. Co., 707 S.E.2d 369, 372 
(Ga. 2011) (quoting Lamar Homes v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 242 S.W.2d 1, 16 
(Tex. 2007)). See J. Watkins, American Empire Surplus Lines v. Hathaway Dev. 
Co.: An Important Occurrence in Georgia Insurance Law, 17 GA. BAR J. 10 
(2011), for a more thorough discussion of this issue. 
22 Architex Ass’n, Inc. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 27 So.3d 1148, 1162 (Miss. 
2010). 
23 ACS Constr. Co., Inc. of Miss. V. CGU, 332 F.3d 885, 888-892 (5th Cir. 
2003). 
24 Architex Ass’n, Inc., 27 So.2d at 1162. Similarly, in Lamar Homes, Inc. v. 
Mid-Continent Casualty Co., the Supreme Court of Texas decided that negligent 
construction could constitute an occurrence. Lamar Homes was decided on 
certified question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
after the federal district court had made an incorrect Erie guess. Lamar Homes, 
Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 335 F. Supp. 2d 754, 758–60 (W.D. Tex. 2004), 
vacated, 501 F.3d 435 (5th Cir. 2007). There was, however, Fifth Circuit authority 
consistent with the Texas Supreme Court’s holding in Lamar Homes. See 
Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Grapevine Excavation Inc., 197 F.3d 720, 725 (5th Cir. 
1999). 
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vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste 
materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or upon the land, 
the atmosphere or any water course or body of water.”  However, the 
policy also contains an exception to the exclusion that potentially restores 
coverage.  Specifically, the exclusion “does not apply if such discharge, 
dispersal, release or escape is sudden and accidental.”25  
Considerable litigation has focused on the meaning of the “sudden 
and accidental” exception that restores coverage.  Some courts have held 
that “sudden and accidental” means that the discharge must have been 
abrupt, and that “sudden” necessarily implies a temporal requirement.  
Hence, under this analysis, a discharge or release over a long period of time 
would be excluded.  Other courts, in roughly equal numbers, have held that 
“sudden” is ambiguous and can reasonably be interpreted to mean 
“unexpected.”  Under this interpretation, liabilities from unexpected long-
term discharges or releases are not excluded.  Which approach a court takes 
is significant, because it essentially means the difference between coverage 
and no coverage for expensive environmental liabilities. 
Not surprisingly, federal courts have made incorrect Erie guesses 
on this issue.  In Mesa Oil, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North America, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit concluded that a 
“New Mexico court would likely honor the plain meaning of the word 
‘sudden’ and conclude that the term encompasses a temporal component, 
and thus that pollution must occur quickly or abruptly before the exemption 
will apply.”26 In United Nuclear Corp. v. Allstate Insurance Co., the 
Supreme Court of New Mexico rejected the reasoning of Mesa Oil, 
specifically disagreeing with the Tenth Circuit’s observation that the 
“trend” was to find a temporal requirement in addition to its analysis of the 
policy language.27 Thus, “Mesa Oil’s holding that ‘sudden’ clearly means 
‘abrupt’ was premised on two assumptions we view to be erroneous . . . .”28  
                                                                                                                 
25 DANIEL P. HALE, CAMBRIDGE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY SPECIAL REPORT: 
HOW ABSOLUTE IS THE ABSOLUTE POLLUTION EXCLUSION? 2 (2008), available at 
http://cambridgeunderwriters.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/How-Absolute-is-
the-Absolute-Pollution-Exclusion.pdf. This Article contains a good discussion of 
the history of the pollution exclusion, including form language prepared by the 
Insurance Services Office (“ISO”). The provision is also quoted in the cases 
discussed in this subsection. 
26 Mesa Oil, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 123 F.3d 1333, 1340 (10th Cir. 1997). 
27 United Nuclear Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 285 P.3d 644 (N.M. 2012). 
28 Id. at 653. 
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In Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of Georgia emphatically rejected 
the argument that “sudden” was ambiguous: “Only in the minds of 
hypercreative lawyers could the word ‘sudden’ be stripped of its essential 
temporal attributes.”29 While not all courts have agreed in this regard, 
recent decisions have recognized with increasing frequency that the 
pollution exclusion does mean just what it says.”30 When the case reached 
the Supreme Court of Georgia on certified question, however, the result 
was different, as was the analysis: “But, on reflection one realizes that, 
even in its popular usage, ‘sudden’ does not usually describe the duration 
of an event, but rather its unexpectedness: a sudden storm, a sudden turn in 
the road, sudden death.  Even when used to describe the onset of an event, 
the word has an elastic temporal connotation that varies with expectations . 
. . .”31 Accordingly, the court concluded that environmental liabilities 
resulting from long term exposures were not excluded. 
 
4. Application of the “Absolute” Pollution Exclusion to 
Non-Environmental Claims 
 
Because many courts, particularly state courts, rejected the 
insurance industry’s interpretation of the “sudden and accidental” pollution 
exclusion, the industry adopted the “absolute” pollution exclusion in 1985.  
This pollution exclusion, in a typical form, excludes claims for bodily 
injury or property damage “arising out of actual or alleged or threatened 
discharge, dispersal, release or escape of pollutants” and defines 
“pollutants” to be “any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or 
contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, alkalis, chemicals and 
waste.”32 
Particularly because the definition of “pollutants” is so broadly 
stated, insurers have, with some success, argued for the application of the 
exclusion to bar coverage for risks unrelated to traditional environmental 
                                                                                                                 
29 Claussen v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 676 F. Supp. 1571, 1580 (S.D. Ga. 
1987), rev’d, 888 F.2d 747 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam). 
30 Id. 
31 Claussen v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 380 S.E.2d 686, 688 (Ga. 1989). 
Claussen illustrates the proper use of the certification procedure discussed at length 
later in this article. 
32 HALE, supra note 25, at 10.  
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pollution, such as, for example, injuries or deaths in homes or other 
buildings resulting from the release of carbon monoxide from improperly 
maintained furnaces.  Some courts, however, have read the exclusion 
narrowly and confined its application to claims involving environmental 
liabilities.  Again, some federal courts have made incorrect Erie guesses on 
this important and contentious issue. 
In Essex Insurance Co. v. Tri-Town Corp., the United States 
District Court for the District of Massachusetts predicted that 
Massachusetts would find the absolute pollution exclusion unambiguous, 
and held that the exclusion barred coverage for underlying claims for 
personal injury resulting from the discharge of carbon monoxide from a 
malfunctioning Zamboni machine at a hockey game.33 Three years later, in 
Western Alliance Insurance Co. v. Gill, the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts reached the opposite conclusion and held that the absolute 
pollution exclusion in a policy did not bar coverage for claims for bodily 
injury sustained due to exposure to carbon monoxide while dining at a 
restaurant because a reasonable insured would not anticipate exclusion 
barred claims for non-environmental pollution.34  
This pattern repeated itself in Ohio.  In Longaberger Co. v. U.S. 
Fidelity & Guarantee Co., the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Ohio, in the absence of Ohio Supreme Court authority, held that 
the absolute pollution exclusion would bar coverage for claims for bodily 
injury resulting from the discharge of carbon monoxide.35 Three years later, 
in Andersen v. Highland House Co., the Ohio Supreme Court reached the 
opposite conclusion, and held that the exclusion did not bar coverage for 
death and bodily injury claims caused by the release of carbon monoxide.36 
 
5. Other Recent Examples 
 
There are other examples of federal courts making Erie guesses 
regarding insurance issues, many of broad potential importance, that were 
later disavowed by the state’s highest court.  For example, the Mississippi 
Supreme Court rejected the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation and application of 
                                                                                                                 
33 Essex Ins. Co. v. Tri-Town Corp., 863 F. Supp. 38, 40–41 (D. Mass. 1994). 
34 W. Alliance Ins. Co. v. Gill, 686 N.E.2d 997, 1000–01 (Mass. 1997). 
35 Longaberger Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 31 F. Supp. 2d 595, 604 (S.D. 
Ohio 1998), aff’d, 201 F.3d 441 (6th Cir. 1999). 
36 Anderson v. Highland House Co., 757 N.E.2d 329, 331 (Ohio 2001). 
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an “anticoncurrent condition clause” that, as applied by the Fifth Circuit, 
precluded coverage for wind damage as well as water damage in Hurricane 
Katrina cases.37  
In other recent cases, state supreme courts have rejected federal 
district court determinations in coverage cases upon certified question from 
the federal Court of Appeals.  Thus, the Court of Appeals of New York 
held, contrary to the federal district court, that a contractual limitation 
period in a fire insurance policy requiring an insured to bring suit within 
two years from the date of “direct physical loss or damage” to recover 
replacement cost was unreasonable and unenforceable where the damaged 
property could not reasonably be replaced in that period.38 The Supreme 
Court of Florida held, contrary to the federal district court, that a policy’s 
advertising injury coverage applied to violations of Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act.39 There are other examples of this trend.40 Although the 
incorrect guesses were thus corrected through the certification process—as 
this Article argues should be standard practice—the cases nevertheless 
illustrate that federal courts continue to make incorrect determinations of 
state law in coverage litigation. 
 
                                                                                                                 
37 Corban v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 20 So.2d 601, 616–18 (Miss. 2009).  
38 Exec. Plaza, LLC v. Peerless Ins. Co., 5 N.E.3d 989, 992 (N.Y. 2014).  
39 Penzer v. Transp. Ins. Co., 29 So.3d 1000, 1008 (Fla. 2010); see 47 U.S.C. 
§ 227 (2000).  
40 E.g., Ewing Constr. Co. v. Amerisure Ins. Co., 420 S.W.3d 30, 38 (Tex. 
2014) (holding, contrary to federal district court and initial panel determination of 
the Fifth Circuit, that general contractor who agrees to perform its construction 
work in a good and workmanlike manner, without more, does not “assume 
liability” for damages so as to trigger the contractual liability exclusion in CGL 
policy); Fin. Indus. Corp. v. XL Specialty Ins. Co., 285 S.W.3d 877, 879 (Tex. 
2009) (holding, contrary to federal district court, that insurer must show prejudice 
to deny payment on a claims made policy based on late notice given within the 
policy period); Cornhusker Cas. Ins. Co. v. Kachman, 198 P.3d 505, 509–10 
(Wash. 2008) (en banc) (holding, contrary to federal district court, that notice of 
cancellation sent by certified mail that was never received did not satisfy state 
statutory requirements for cancellation). 
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III.  PERCEIVED AND REAL BENEFITS OF FEDERAL COURTS 
TO INSURERS 
 
The cases in the preceding section suggest that in many instances a 
federal venue favored the insurer.  The substantive results support my own 
experience that insurers strongly, as a general rule, favor federal court.41 
This section will demonstrate that the available survey and statistical 
evidence also supports this view.  
When an insurance company is sued in state court, it has a strong 
tendency to invoke removal jurisdiction to move the case to federal court, if 
possible.  The use of the removal process is significant.  Approximately 
eleven to twelve percent of private litigant cases arrive in federal court by 
removal.42 Between 2007 and 2011, over 30,000 cases were removed 
annually from state court to federal court, with 34,190 cases removed in 
2011.43 But, the raw numbers may not tell the full story.  Because of the 
$75,000 jurisdictional threshold for removal,44 it is likely that the most 
significant cases—at least from a monetary point of view—end up in 
federal court. 
                                                                                                                 
41 Some quarters of academia reject such experiential evidence. That said, the 
views of experienced practitioners should not be dismissed. In the words of 
baseball great Yogi Berra (“Berra”): “In theory, there is no difference between 
theory and practice. In practice, there is.” Yogi Berra Quotes, BRAINYQUOTE 
http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/y/yogiberra141506.html (last visited 
Feb. 3, 2015). Berra also said: “You can observe a lot by just watching.” Yogi 
Berra Quotes, BRAINYQUOTE, http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/y/ 
yogiberra125285.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2015). 
42 Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases 
Under Diversity and Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 369, 388 
(1992). 
43 DIR. OF THE ADMIN. OFF. OF U.S. COURTS, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE 
DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS Table C-8 (2013) 
[hereinafter “Director’s Report”], available at http://www.uscourts.gov 
/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2013/appendices/C08Sep13.pdf (reporting the 
number of cases removed for 2012 and 2013 decreased slightly but remained 
above 32,000). 
44 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2012) (providing that actions which could have been 
brought in the original jurisdiction of federal courts are generally removable); see 
also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012) (matters between citizens of different states 
“where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of 
interest and costs” are within the original jurisdiction of the federal district courts).  
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A. PROCEDURAL PREFERENCE FOR FEDERAL COURT 
 
A detailed attorney survey by Neal Miller regarding the use of 
removal jurisdiction revealed that defense counsel, including a large 
proportion representing insurance companies, “almost uniformly favored 
federal court judges (85.6%).”45 Miller’s findings regarding defense counsel 
generally apply to insurers.  An insurer may file a declaratory judgment 
action and thus act as the plaintiff.  However, the surveys in the Miller 
study revealed that only 1.6% of plaintiff attorneys represented insurance 
companies, while 30.7% of defense attorney’s represented insurance 
companies.46 Accordingly, the survey results attributed to defense counsel 
would overwhelmingly include the views of those representing insurers.  
Forty-seven-and-nine-tenths percent (47.9%) of defense attorneys reported 
that the availability of summary judgment rulings was an important factor 
in choosing a federal forum.47 Further, when adjusted by experience in 
federal court, the percentage became extremely significant: “Among those 
defense attorneys who reported that over 50% of their practice occurred in 
federal court, two-thirds (66.6%) said that federal court summary judgment 
rules were a factor in forum selection, and 32.8% cited it as a ‘very strong’ 
reason for removal.”48 
Although the Miller study was published in 1992, there is reason to 
believe that defense counsel’s—and hence insurer counsel’s—preference 
for federal court has increased in the intervening twenty-three years.  In 
1993, the Supreme Court decided Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., which imposed new requirements limiting the 
introduction of expert testimony in federal court.49 Further, the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly50 and Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal51 established more stringent pleading requirements, thus permitting 
                                                                                                                 
45 Miller, supra note 42, at 414.  
46 Id. at 400 ex. 2. 
47 Id. at 418.  
48 Id. at 419. 
49 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993); see also 
Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 158 (1999).  
50 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).   
51 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 
570).     
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the dismissal of cases filed in federal court before the discovery process.52 
These developments all favor the defense and provide additional procedural 
tools that did not exist at the time of the Miller survey. 
Federal court statistics from the Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts back up the perceptions that defense counsel favor 
federal court.  Statistics further suggest that the use of summary 
adjudication in federal court is substantial and increasing.  Statistics from 
1997 through 2012 regarding civil insurance cases in federal court 
consistently indicate that approximately 73% to 79% of cases terminated 
by court action were terminated before pretrial.53 Further, the percentage of 
cases actually decided by trial was both minuscule and declining.  In 1997, 
3.7% of insurance cases were decided by trial (jury and non-jury).  The 
percentage resolved by trial stayed above 3% until 2002, when it dropped 
to 2.5%.  The percentage stayed above 2% but below 3% until 2007, when 
it dropped to 1.6%.54 Since 2007, the percentage of insurance cases decided 
by trial has stayed below 2%, ranging from 1.2% to 1.8%.55 
These percentage differences may seem insignificant, but they 
represent a substantial decline in the number of insurance cases proceeding 
to trial in the federal courts.  The raw numbers for several years between 
1997 and 2013 tell the story. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
52 The complaint must include sufficient factual allegations “to raise a right to  
relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “To survive a 
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 
53 Director’s Report, supra note 43, at Table C–4.  
54 Id.  
55 Id. 
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Insurance Cases Resolved by Jury Trial in Federal Court56 
Year Non-Jury Trials Jury Trials Total Trials 
1997 83 161 244
2003 72 104 176
2007 47 97 144
2011 37 94 131
2012 34 95 129
2013 42 90 132
 
Therefore, there is simply no doubt that the federal courts are very 
likely to dispose of insurance cases before trial, and the chances of a case 
going to trial is exceedingly low.  From 2011 to 2013, approximately 130 
insurance cases per year went to trial in the entire federal court system, a 
very low number. 
 
B. SUBSTANTIVE PREFERENCE FOR FEDERAL COURT 
 
Insurance companies prefer federal court for substantive reasons as 
well.  Fifty-three-and-one-half percent (53.5%) of defense counsel 
responding to the Miller survey “cited the likelihood of a more favorable 
federal court legal ruling.”57 Although the substantive differences were 
more difficult to specify than the procedural advantages of federal court, 
defense counsel were clear in their perception: “The research findings 
indicate that some areas of state law are not consistently followed by 
federal court rulings.”58 Survey responses indicated that federal courts may 
                                                                                                                 
56 Director’s Report, supra, note 43, at Table C–4; DIR. OF THE ADMIN. OFF. 
OF U.S. COURTS, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF 
THE UNITED STATES COURTS Table C–4 (2012); DIR. OF THE ADMIN. OFF. OF U.S. 
COURTS, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE 
UNITED STATES COURTS Table C–4 (2011); DIR. OF THE ADMIN. OFF. OF U.S. 
COURTS, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE 
UNITED STATES COURTS C–4 (2007); DIR. OF THE ADMIN. OFF. OF U.S. COURTS, 
2003 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED 
STATES COURTS Table C–4 (2003); DIR. OF THE ADMIN. OFF. OF U.S. COURTS, 
1997 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED 
STATES COURTS Table C–4 (1997).  
57 Miller, supra note 42, at 417.  
58 Id. at 437. 
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make their own predictions of state law and ignore precedent from 
intermediate state appellate courts.59 The survey concluded that although no 
conclusions about the pervasiveness of the problem could be reached, “the 
large proportion of attorneys in the study who anticipated different rulings 
of law in state court points to the need for more definitive study.”60 
Thus, the reason why plaintiffs and defendants battle so fiercely 
over a state or federal forum is simple: despite Erie, federal courts are 
perceived, particularly by defense counsel, to decide procedural and 
substantive issues of state law differently than state courts.  Statistics 
validate the perception that federal judges are very likely to dispose of 
cases without a trial.  The risk of proceeding to trial for an insurer in 
federal court, which has been small for years, is now almost non-existent. 
 
IV.  CONSEQUENCES 
 
The substantive misapplication of state law has serious 
consequences that directly undermine the fundamental principle of 
federalism underlying Erie, namely, the state courts’ ability to decide and 
shape state law.  Moreover, perceived differences between the way federal 
and state courts decide state law encourage insurers and other parties to 
seek a federal forum, further undermining Erie’s policy against forum 
shopping. 
 
A. DEPRIVATION OF SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS 
 
An incorrect Erie guess deprives a litigant of substantive rights.  In 
the insurance context, the consequences are particularly obvious.  An 
insured denied coverage based on an incorrect interpretation of state law 
loses, in a first party property case, the right to recover for a loss.  In a 
liability case, the consequences may be even more severe, because the 
insured loses both the benefit of an insurer-provided defense as well as 
indemnity for any settlement or judgment.  Further, insurance may provide 
the only means of recovery for the plaintiff. 
Further, the loss is generally without any possible recourse.  As 
observed by Judge Calabresi of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit: “In such a situation, the party who lost in federal court has 
                                                                                                                 
59 Id. at 440. 
60 Id.  
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been unjustly denied her state-law rights, and often has been left with no 
means of effective redress.”61 In discussing a case in which a litigant was 
deprived of ownership of a valuable painting because of an incorrect Erie 
guess, Judge Calabresi noted that the plaintiff was deprived of her property 
“not because of any decision by the highest court of New York, but rather 
because of the will of the federal courts.”62  
The ramifications of an incorrect Erie guess, particularly in 
insurance coverage cases, often extend far beyond the lack of redress in a 
single case.  Because the ruling becomes persuasive precedent, it is likely 
to be applied multiple times until the state’s highest court issues a contrary 
ruling.  Accordingly, a single mistake may be repeated again and again.  
Because insurance policies are typically written on common policy forms, 
the potential for repeated errors in coverage litigation is acute. 63 
 
B. ENCOURAGING FORUM SHOPPING 
 
When a federal court decides an unsettled question of state law, it 
potentially undermines principles of federalism.  This includes 
circumventing the right of a state’s highest court to determine questions of 
state law.  In the context of discussing a hypothetical product liability case, 
Judge Calabresi observed: 
 
If the federal court treats the plaintiff more favorably than 
the state tribunal would, then the plaintiff always files in 
federal court; similarly any departure in the manufacturer’s 
favor leads the defendant to remove any suit filed in state 
court.  In either case, the state loses the ability to develop 
or restate the principles that it believes should govern the 
category of cases.64 
                                                                                                                 
61 McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 159 (2d Cir. 1997) (Calabresi, J., 
dissenting). Judge Calabresi’s dissent provides rare analysis and commentary from 
a member of the federal judiciary on this important subject.  
62 Id. (Calabresi, J., dissenting).  
63 As noted previously, this is exactly what happened in the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia and the Eleventh Circuit 
regarding coverage for construction defects. See supra notes 19–21 and 
accompanying text. 
64 McCarthy, 119 F.3d at 158. 
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This is no small matter, particularly in light of the discussion above 
showing that federal courts routinely decide unsettled questions of state 
law, and often decide them incorrectly. 
Further, contrary to Erie’s intent, federal court decisions on 
unsettled questions of state law encourage forum shopping.  As noted in the 
quotation from Judge Calabresi above, it really does not matter which party 
the decision favors, as one side or the other will be encouraged to forum 
shop in federal court.  
For insurance coverage cases, experience and statistics show, as 
discussed above, that the insured will usually wish to proceed in state court 
and the insurer will normally wish to proceed in federal court.  Further, as a 
general proposition and as demonstrated above, federal judges have always 
been likely, and are becoming even more likely, to rule on motions to 
dismiss or for summary judgment, resulting in a minuscule chance for an 
insurance coverage case to proceed to trial. 
Accordingly, when there is an insurance coverage dispute, and 
there is diversity jurisdiction, the insurer may well race to file first in 
federal court.  If the insured files first in state court, the insurer will often 
still have the option to remove the case to federal court.  To be sure, there 
may be jurisdictions in which the opposite situation prevails, and the 
insured would prefer to proceed in federal court and the insurer in state 
court.  In such instances, the insured can use the same procedural 
techniques to maneuver the case to federal court.65 But recognizing this 
possibility merely highlights the fundamental point: In all cases in which 
diversity exists and there is an unsettled question of state law, one party is 
likely to try to maneuver the case to federal court to achieve a different 
substantive result.  
 
V.  POSSIBLE REMEDIES 
 
A. ELIMINATING DIVERSITY JURISDICTION 
 
One obvious solution would simply be to eliminate diversity 
jurisdiction.  Diversity jurisdiction is controversial, and there have long 
been calls to eliminate it.  In the past several decades, serious legislative 
                                                                                                                 
65 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2012). 
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efforts were made to abolish diversity jurisdiction.66 Most notably, in 1990, 
a specially appointed federal study committee recommended repealing 
diversity jurisdiction in all but a limited number of situations on the basis 
that no type of jurisdiction had a “weaker claim” on federal judicial 
resources, and because eliminating diversity jurisdiction would reduce the 
caseload of the federal courts.67 Predictably, the committee’s 
recommendation met with substantial resistance, including among the bar.68 
Efforts to limit or curtail diversity jurisdiction have failed, and, as 
Professor Underwood put it, “Congress chose a different path.”69 Most 
recently, Congress expanded the scope of federal jurisdiction through the 
adoption of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”),70 which 
expands federal court jurisdiction to cover certain class action lawsuits in 
the absence of complete diversity.71 
Regardless of the recent change in political fortunes, the 
elimination of diversity jurisdiction would seem, under almost any 
circumstance, to be highly improbable.  Any such effort would be strongly 
opposed by insurers, big business, and the defense bar.  In short, little basis 
                                                                                                                 
66 The House of Representatives voted twice to abolish diversity jurisdiction in 
the late 1970s, even though it never reached the Senate. James M. Underwood, The 
Late, Great Diversity Jurisdiction, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 199 (2007) 
[hereinafter “Underwood”]. Underwood’s article provides a comprehensive and 
entertaining recitation of the ebb and flow of support or diversity jurisdiction. See also 
L. Lynn Hogue, Law in a Parallel Universe: Erie’s Betrayal, Diversity Jurisdiction, 
Georgia Conflicts of Laws Questions in Contracts Cases in the Eleventh Circuit, and 
Certification Reform, 11 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 531, 533–35 (1995). 
67 H.R. REP. NO. 5381, at 63 (1990). 
68 See Report of the N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers' Ass’n Comm. on the Fed. Courts on 
the Recommendation of the Fed. Courts Study Comm. to Abolish Diversity 
Jurisdiction Adopted by the Bd. of Dirs. of the N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers’ Ass’n, 158 
F.R.D. 185 (1995) [hereinafter “New York Committee Report”]. The New York 
Committee Report contains a measured but very detailed criticism of the 
Committee Report, including a survey of federal judges that casts doubt upon the 
Committee Report’s underlying assumptions.  
69 Underwood, supra note 66, at 201.  
70 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1711–1714 (2012). 
71 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). 
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exists for challenging Professor Baker’s observation that “no one should 
expect it to be abolished in an existing lifetime plus twenty-one years.”72  
Further, the expansion of federal court jurisdiction suggests that the 
federal courts will necessarily be facing an even greater number of state 
law questions.  Thus, the question remains how to achieve the goals and 
requirements of Erie.  Fortunately, a ready solution exists, although not in 
the way it is currently utilized. 
 
B. USE OF AVAILABLE CERTIFICATION PROCEDURES 
 
When a federal court in a diversity case faces an uncertain question 
of state law, it currently has three possible choices.  First, the court can 
predict how the state’s highest court would rule, often leading to 
unsatisfactory results as discussed above.  Second, the court can abstain 
from deciding the question under the Pullman abstention doctrine, which is 
seldom applicable.73 Third, if available, the court can certify the question to 
the state’s highest court under statutory certification procedures.  Almost 
all states now have certification statutes, so the opportunity to certify exists 
in most cases.74  
                                                                                                                 
72 THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF THE 
U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 190 (1994). 
73 See generally R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). 
The Pullman abstention doctrine generally provides that, “if [there are] unsettled 
questions of state law in a case that may make it unnecessary to decide a federal 
constitutional question, the federal court should abstain until the state court has 
resolved the state questions.” 17A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & 
EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 295 (3d ed. 2007). 
74 Rebecca A. Cochran, Federal Court Certification of Questions of State Law to 
Federal Courts: A Theoretical and Empirical Study, 29 J. LEGIS. 157, 159 n.13 (2003)  
(compiling statues); see also JONA GOLDSCHMIDT, CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF 
STATE LAW 1, 15–17 (American Judicature Society ed., 1995) (listing 43 states as of 
1995). Cochran lists Arkansas, North Carolina, and New Jersey as not having 
certification procedures. However, New Jersey adopted a statute permitting 
certification effective in 2000, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2:12A-1 (West 1999), and Arkansas 
adopted certification in 2002, see Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 6-8; Longview Prod. Co. v. 
Dubberly, 352 Ark. 207, 208 (2003) (“Rule 6–8 was adopted in 2002 pursuant to 
Section 2(D)(3) of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution: ‘The Supreme Court 
shall have original jurisdiction to answer questions of state law certified by a court of 
the United States which may be exercised pursuant to Supreme Court rule’”). It 
appears that North Carolina is the only state that has not adopted a certification 
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Florida was the first state to adopt a certification statute in 1945. 
Over fifty years ago in Clay v. Sun Insurance Office Ltd., Justice 
Frankfurter lauded the “rare foresight” of the Florida legislature by 
providing a mechanism for “authoritatively determining unresolved state 
law involved in federal litigation by a statute which permits a federal court 
to certify such a doubtful question of state law to the Supreme Court of 
Florida for its decision.”75  
Since Clay, the Supreme Court has enthusiastically embraced the 
use of the certification procedure in a number of cases.76 The Court has 
stressed: “Through certification of novel or unsettled questions of state law 
for authoritative answers by a state’s highest court, a federal court may 
save ‘time, energy, and resources and hel[p] build a cooperative judicial 
federalism.’”77 The Court has observed that a “question of state law usually 
can be resolved definitively . . . if a certification procedure is available and 
is successfully utilized.”78 
 
                                                                                                                 
provision. Eric Eisenberg, A Divine Comity: Certification (at Last) in North Carolina, 
58 DUKE L.J. 69, 71 (2008) (“North Carolina remains the only state never to have 
enacted such a procedure, putting it behind the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the 
Northern Mariana Islands, and Guam.”) (footnotes omitted); see Shakira Robinson, 
Right, But for the Wrong Reasons: How A Certified Question to the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina Could Have Alleviated Conflicting Views and Brought Clarity to 
North Carolina State Law, 34 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 230, 230 (2012) (“Unconstitutional 
or dogmatic, North Carolina is the only state that has never enacted a procedure by 
which a federal court could certify a question of state law to its state Supreme Court”). 
As noted by Eisenberg, although Missouri has adopted a statute permitting 
certification, the Missouri Supreme Court has refused to accept certified questions on 
the ground they are not within its jurisdiction under the Missouri Constitution. See 
Grantham v. Missouri Dep’t of Corr., No. 72576, 1990 WL 602159, at *1 (Mo. July 
13, 1990). 
75 Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 212 (1960).  
76 E.g., Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 398 (1988) 
(certifying questions to Supreme Court of Virginia); Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 
U.S. 386, 395 (1974) (remanding for consideration of certification to Supreme 
Court of Florida). 
77 Arizonans for Official English v. Ariz., 520 U.S. 43, 77 (1997) (quoting 
Lehman Bros., 416 U.S. at 391). 
78 Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 237 n.4 (1991). 
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C. THE PROBLEM: LACK OF UNIFORM APPLICATION OF 
CERTIFICATION 
 
Although the Supreme Court has endorsed the use of certification 
procedures when available, it has never established definitive standards for 
certification.  Rather, the Court has stated that the decision to certify is one 
of discretion, and “not obligatory.”79 However, the Court has not provided 
guidance to the federal courts on the factors to be considered in exercising 
their discretion.  As one District Court judge observed: “The Supreme 
Court has never indicated the necessary conditions before a court can resort 
to certification.”80 
In the absence of definitive guidance from the Supreme Court, 
there remains considerable conflict among the Circuits in the approach to 
be taken in certifying questions for review.  Some courts take a hospitable 
view, noting the Supreme Court’s enthusiastic support for certification.81 
For example among this group, the courts certify simply when “[t]here is 
no controlling precedent to be found in the decisions.”82 The Eighth Circuit 
certified “because of the unsettled nature of Nebraska law on this issue and 
because a determination of this issue could be dispositive of this case.”83  
Conversely, other courts take a very restrictive view.  The Second 
Circuit resorts to certification “sparingly” on the theory that its job is to 
predict how the Court of Appeals of New York would rule.84 Another court 
adopted a restrictive six-part test.85 Some courts seem irritated with the 
very suggestion of certification, particularly after they have decided an 
unsettled question of state law.86 Other courts appear to have charted a 
                                                                                                                 
79 Lehman Bros., 416 U.S. at 390–391 (certification “not obligatory” and 
matter of discretion, but helps build a “cooperative judicial federalism”). 
80 Fiat Motors of N. Am. Inc. v. Mayor of Wilmington, 619 F. Supp. 29, 33 
(D.C. Del. 1985). 
81 E.g., Puckett v. Rufenacht, Bromagen & Hertz, Inc., 903 F.2d 1014 (5th 
Cir. 1990). 
82 Holmes v. Amerex Rent-A-Car, 113 F.3d 1285, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
83 Hatfield v. Bishop Clarkson Mem’l Hosp., 701 F.2d 1266, 1267 (8th Cir. 
1983). 
84 E.g., Runner v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 568 F.3d 383, 388 (2d Cir. 2009). 
85 Zimmer v. Travelers Ins. Co., 454 F. Supp. 2d 839, 861 (S.D. Iowa 2006). 
86 One court has remarked: 
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middle ground: “While we apply judgment and restraint before certifying, 
however, we will nonetheless employ the device in circumstances where 
the question before us (1) may be determinative of the case at hand and (2) 
is sufficiently novel that we feel uncomfortable attempting to decide it 
without further guidance.”87 
Notably, some courts have been inconsistent in considering 
certification in their own rulings.  For example, the Eleventh Circuit has 
stated both that (1) a question should be certified if there is “any doubt” as 
to state law on an issue88 and (2) that it will “exercise discretion and 
restraint in deciding to certify questions to state courts.”89 The Eleventh 
Circuit recently recited the “any doubt” test, but also inconsistently stated 
that certification decisions must be made with “restraint.”90 Even more 
recently, the Eleventh Circuit appeared to abandon the “any doubt” test, 
noting that certification should be used with “restraint,” but declared that 
“truly debatable” issues of state law should be certified.91 It is thus 
impossible to ascertain any clear standard for certification in this court. 
                                                                                                                 
Certification is not to be routinely invoked whenever a 
federal court is presented with an unsettled question of state law. 
Late requests for certification are rarely granted by this court and 
are generally disapproved, particularly when the district court 
has already ruled. Filing a motion to certify after an adverse 
ruling, as was done in this case, is not favored. 
Potter v. Synerlink Corp., No.08-CV-674-GKF-TLW, 2012 WL 2886015, at *1 
(N.D. Okla. July 13, 2012) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The 
approach advocated by Potter may be questioned, as it essentially asks advocates 
to assume the federal court will make a mistake and to request certification before 
ruling. An advocate may, with some understanding, be reluctant to make such a 
suggestion for strategic reasons. In any event, a refusal to grant a legitimate request 
for certification based solely on timing seems to undermine the basic reason for the 
process: a correct determination of state law by the court authorized to have the 
final and definitive word. 
87 Pino v. United States, 507 F.3d 1233, 1236 (10th Cir. 2007). 
88 Colonial Props., Inc. v. Vogue Cleaners, Inc., 77 F.3d 384, 387 (11th Cir. 
1996). 
89 Escareno v. Noltina Crucible & Refractory Corp., 139 F.3d 1456, 1461 
(11th Cir. 1998). 
90 Royal Capital Dev., LLC v. Md. Cas. Co., 659 F.3d 1050, 1054–1055 (11th 
Cir. 2011). 
91 Ruderman ex rel. Schwartz v. Wash. Nat. Ins. Corp., 671 F.3d 1208, 1212 
(11th Cir. 2012). 
2015 ERIE DENIED 481 
 
D. THE NEED FOR CLEAR STANDARDS FOR CERTIFICATION 
 
Use of the certification process clearly fosters the policies 
underlying Erie, and promotes, as the Supreme Court has said, a 
“cooperative judicial federalism.”92 As currently practiced, however, 
certification procedures often serve only to add a further level of 
uncertainty in deciding unsettled questions of state law.  Although some 
use of certification is better than none, the reality is that the availability of 
certification is dependent upon the court in which the case is pending, and, 
in many cases, seems to turn on nothing more than how the judicial winds 
are blowing on a particular day.  
The result is that, while some litigants receive the constitutional 
benefits of certification, others do not.  Equally important, a state’s highest 
court is often deprived of its constitutional prerogative to determine the law 
of the state.  Fortunately, the status quo need not continue.  The best 
solution would be a definitive ruling from the Supreme Court, establishing 
liberal and consistent standards for certification.  Even in the absence of 
Supreme Court guidance, however, lower federal courts can and should 
adopt consistent principles designed to foster the use of available 
certification procedures consistent with the constitutional mandate of Erie. 
 
E. TOWARD A CONSTITUTIONALLY CONSISTENT APPROACH TO 
CERTIFICATION 
 
A constitutionally consistent approach toward certification should 
be far more uniform than is currently practiced, but will not be completely 
uniform.  The guiding principle of federalism is that certification must be 
consistent with the requirements of the state certification statute.  
Obviously, if a state has mandated certain requirements, they must be 
followed, and state certification procedures, although generally consistent 
in their broad outline, vary somewhat.  Some procedures permit only the 
United States Supreme Court and the United States Courts of Appeal to 
certify.  Others permit United States District Courts to certify as well.  
Some statutes establish additional requirements.93 Whatever state statutory 
requirements exist, the first principle is that they should be satisfied before 
a question is certified.  That said, states that do not currently permit District 
                                                                                                                 
92 Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 239-240 (1991). 
93 GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note 74, at 15–17.  
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Courts to certify should strongly consider amending their statutes.  
Certification by a District Court permits the parties to obtain a definitive 
determination of unsettled law early in the litigation, thus promoting 
efficiency. 
Second, subject to state requirements, there should be a liberal 
presumption in favor of certifying unsettled questions of state law.  This 
approach is consistent with the Supreme Court’s oft-stated enthusiasm for 
certification, not to mention Erie’s core principle of federalism.  It is also 
hardly radical.  As noted above, some federal courts have followed this 
approach.  Further, this approach is also consistent with the states’ own 
endorsement of the certification mechanism as demonstrated by the nearly 
unanimous adoption of the process.  In the insurance context, certification 
has been used—although haphazardly and pursuant to different standards—
to resolve many unsettled state insurance questions.94 
Third, the certifying court should consider whether a particular 
area of law, or a particular question, has led other courts to reach differing 
conclusions.  As discussed above, the insurance coverage cases provide a 
particular example of such an area.  If so, this factor will further support 
certification. 
Fourth, the certifying court should make a clear determination that 
the controlling legal question has not been decided by the state’s highest 
court, and it should clearly articulate the controlling question of state law.  
In most instances, this can and will be done without difficulty.  In other 
cases, however, the case may turn not on a disputed or undecided 
substantive legal principle but upon the admissibility of evidence or other 
non-substantive issues.  In such instances, certification might not be 
appropriate. 
Fifth, the certifying court may wish to consider whether the legal 
principle has potential significance beyond the current case.  In most 
instances, it is likely that there will be future ramifications.  This is 
particularly true in the area of insurance coverage, because policies are 
written on standardized forms, virtually assuring that the same question 
will arise in multiple cases.  Nevertheless, there may be cases that are so 
unique that certification would lend little to the development of state law, 
and, in such circumstances, certification may be declined.  Even then, 
                                                                                                                 
94 See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text. 
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however, consideration of the substantive rights of the litigants may favor 
certification.95 
This approach will foster the principles of federalism that underlie 
Erie.  It should decrease incentives for forum shopping between state and 
federal courts in the same jurisdiction.  It will help prevent litigants from 
being deprived of substantive rights under state law through incorrect Erie 
guesses.  Perhaps most importantly, it will ensure that the court entitled to 
make the final determination of state law gets a fair chance to make it. 
It may be questioned whether these principles should apply only to 
insurance coverage litigation or generally.  My view is that they should 
apply generally, because the policies underlying Erie apply generally.  That 
said, the principles are particularly applicable to insurance coverage 
litigation, and if consistently applied, almost all unsettled insurance 
coverage issues would qualify for certification. 
 
VI.  A POSTSCRIPT: “WHY” REALLY DOES NOT MATTER 
 
An early draft of this Article attempted to explain why federal 
often courts seem to decide insurance coverage cases differently than state 
courts; specifically, whether there is some identifiable difference in 
procedural approach or substantive doctrine that explained the divergence.  
At the end of the day, it was simply not possible to determine any definitive 
reasons why federal courts often decide insurance coverage cases 
differently from state courts, even though the evidence strongly suggests 
that they do. 
One thing, however, is clear: different states often reach 
diametrically differing conclusions regarding the meaning and application 
of insurance policy forms.96 Accordingly, when a federal court faces an 
unsettled question of state insurance law, there may well be conflicting 
precedent from other jurisdictions based on fundamentally different 
approaches.  Thus, when a federal court chooses one line of precedent in 
the face of substantial precedent to the contrary, it increases the probability 
                                                                                                                 
95 Of course, there may be other unique factors militating in favor of or 
against certification, and the law should always allow for considerations applicable 
to the case under consideration. With that said, the consideration of unique factors 
should not undermine the general presumption in favor of certification. 
96 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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of an incorrect Erie guess, because the state’s highest court might well 
choose the reasoning in the other cases. 
The fact that a federal court may choose to follow one line of 
conflicting precedent over another on an unsettled question is not, in the 
abstract, “wrong,” if the federal court were left to its own devices.  The 
problem, however, is that Erie does not leave federal courts to their own 
devices, but rather directs them to follow state law, even if they believe 
another approach would be preferable.  The state’s highest court has the 
last word, or at any rate, is supposed to have it. 
Accordingly, rather than focusing on how they would decide the 
question, the federal courts should instead focus on using certification 
procedures to allow the state’s highest court to exercise its constitutional 
prerogative to make the decision.  Such an approach fosters the 
“cooperative judicial federalism”97 on which Erie is based, and renders 
moot the question of why federal courts would decide the issue differently. 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
 Although Erie has been the law of the land for over seventy years, its 
constitutional underpinnings are often forgotten.  The fundamental principle 
underlying Erie is that the highest court of a state must have the final say in 
interpreting and determining state law.  In spite of this principle, federal courts 
routinely make guesses on state law insurance questions, and frequently come 
up with the wrong answers.  Incorrect Erie guesses not only affect the 
substantive rights of litigants, they undermine the constitutionally mandated 
prerogative of state courts to determine state law. 
 Certification statutes provide a readily available remedy in 
virtually every state.  Although certification has been widely praised by the 
United States Supreme Court, its use in practice varies greatly, with some 
courts liberally granting certification, and others only in exceptional 
circumstances.  As a result, the best available mechanism for implementing 
Erie’s principles has been unevenly applied.  The approach advocated in 
this Article will bring greater uniformity and greater availability to 
certification procedures, and will also help eliminate forum shopping, with 
the ultimate result being that the principles of federalism underlying Erie 
are properly applied. 
                                                                                                                 
97 Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 390–391 (1974). 
